Voter attitudes to inter-party transfers in Northern Ireland: 

a median-difference analysis of inter-party transfers in the 1982 and 1988 Assembly elections by O'Kelly, Michael & Doyle, John
  
                  DCU Business School 
 
                        RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
     PAPER NO. 42 
     2000 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voter Attitudes to Inter-Party Transfers in 
Northern Ireland:  
A Median-Difference Analysis of Inter-Party 
Transfers in the 1982 and 1988 Assembly 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Michael O’Kelly 
University College Dublin  
 
Dr. John Doyle 
Dublin City University 
 
 
ISSN 1393-290X 
 DCU Business School  
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 42 
 
VOTER ATTITUDES TO INTER-PARTY TRANSFERS IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND: 
A MEDIAN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS OF INTER-PARTY TRANSFERS IN 
THE 1982 AND 1998 ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT  
The impact of the 1998 peace agreement in Northern Ireland on electoral behaviour 
is analysed in this article by plotting median differences in inter-party transfers under 
the PR by Single Transferable Vote system used in 1998 and in 1982.  There is clear 
evidence that moderate and militant nationalists have followed the lead of their party 
elites and have transferred lower preference votes to each other at higher levels and 
more consistently in 1998 than in 1982. Patterns of change within unionism are more 
complex.  While there were some signs of a slightly increased willingness from pro-
Agreement unionists to transfer to moderate nationalists and a fall in the percentage 
of transfers to anti-Agreement unionists, there was still considerable consistency of 
support between the unionist parties despite the split over the peace agreement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly election the Unionist parties were bitterly and 
openly divided on the issue of the Good Friday peace agreement, with the 
mainstream Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the small loyalist parties - the 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) - 
supporting the Agreement while Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and 
the small UK Unionist Party (UKUP) opposed it.   Within the UUP there was a 
substantial bloc opposed to the recently signed Belfast Agreement, with as many as 
25% of their supporters opposing the deal in the May 1998 referendum 
(Doyle,1998,15).  On the other hand, the Nationalist side had more cause to unite 
than at any time in living memory.  The 'nationalist consensus' at the heart of the 
peace process had produced a 'yes' vote estimated at 99% within the northern 
nationalist community and at 95% in the Republic of Ireland.  Many commentators, 
therefore, analysed the Assembly election as a kind of second run of the Good Friday 
agreement referendum, comparing total votes for pro- and anti-Agreement parties, 
and even distinguishing pro- and anti-Agreement candidates within the UUP (e.g. 
Millar, 1998).  
 
The election was conducted under a system of PRSTV in six-seat constituencies.  An 
analysis of the results can, therefore, be significantly more sophisticated than a 
straightforward headcount, for or against the Agreement.  Voters had the opportunity 
to rank all candidates in order, if they so wished, and could therefore transfer their 
lower preference votes not only outside their party but also outside their community.  
Pro-Agreement voters could cross the traditional community divide in Northern 
Ireland to assist others in election contests with anti-Agreement candidates.  The 
focus of this paper is the extent to which the 1998 Northern Ireland peace agreement 
influenced voter behaviour in this way.  It is possible to analyse the level of change 
over time as a similar voting system was used in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections of 1982.1  1982 has the coincidental advantage of marking the entry of Sinn 
Féin (SF) into electoral politics and so while the period between the elections to be 
compared is quite long, they do mark the beginning of the current model of electoral 
competition and the first post-Agreement election.  While the terms pro-Agreement 
and anti-Agreement are politically meaningless in 1982, the party divisions were well 
                                                          
1In the Forum election of 1996 voters could only indicate a single preference and Northern Ireland's 
Westminster elections are of course conducted on the 'First Past the Post' system. 
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established then and so as a summarising descriptive label to track shifts in voter 
behaviour these blocs offer a useful analysis. 
 
Although the principal subject of this paper is the change in inter-party and cross-
community vote transfers from 1982 to 1998, it will be useful to present briefly the 
overall result of the 1998 election, together with an indication of the changes from 
1982 in first preference votes.  Since the intervening period between the two strictly 
comparable elections is comparatively long, the gain/loss in percentages of votes 
compared to the 1996 Forum election is also presented here.  
 
The pattern of change is clear from tables one and two.  The overall unionist vote 
(pro and anti-Agreement) declined from 55.5% in 1982 to just over 50% in 1998. The 
Alliance Party (AP) vote also declined from 9.3% to 6.5% over this period as the 
'cross community' bloc dispersed to the Women's Coalition and other very small 
parties, while the nationalist vote increased from 32% to just 40%. 2  
 
Table 1: Party votes in 1998, with changes since the Forum election of 1996 and since 
1982, in percentages 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
              -------------------------First preference votes-------------------- 
% % Gain(loss) % Gain(loss) Gain(loss) 
1998 1996 1998 vs 1996 1982 1996 vs 1982 1998 vs 1982 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 UUP           21.3      24.2     (2.91) 29.7     (5.57) (8.48)      
 SDLP          22.0      21.4      0.59 18.8      2.59   3.18       
 DUP           18.1      18.8     (0.66)     23.0     (4.19) (4.85)      
 SF            17.6      15.5      2.16      10.1      5.33   7.49       
 AP             6.5       6.5     (0.04)  9.3     (2.76) (2.80)      
 UKUP           4.5       3.7      0.82   .        3.69   4.51       
 PUP            2.5       3.5     (0.92)  0.2      3.27      2.35       
 UDP            1.1       2.2     (1.15)   .     2.22   1.07       
 NIWC           1.6       1.0      0.58   .       1.03      1.61       
 Ind            1.5       2.3     (0.79)  0.4      1.86   1.07       
 OthU           3.0       0.4      2.64  5.5     (5.12)  (2.48)      
 OthN           0.3       0.6     (0.32)  3.0     (2.34)  (2.66)      
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The Alliance Party is termed 'cross-community' in this article as their votes are drawn from both 
communities even though they are clearly a 'pro-union' party in political terms. 
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Table 2: Party votes in 1998, with changes since the Forum election of 1996 and since 
1982, in percentages, grouped by alignment to community and to the Good Friday 
agreement 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                     -------------------------First preference votes------------------------ 
                     %         %        Gain(loss)       %        Gain(loss)      Gain(loss) 
                   1998      1996     1998 vs 1996     1982     1996 vs 1982    1998 vs 1982 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Un pro-agreem        24.9      29.9     (4.99)           29.9     (0.08)          (5.07)      
 Un anti-agreem       25.7      22.8      2.81            25.6     (2.73)           0.07       
 Cross-community       9.4       9.8     (0.48)            9.7      0.13           (0.35)      
 Nationalist          39.9      37.5      2.43            31.9      5.58            8.0       
 N/A                   0.2        .       0.23             2.9      N/A            (2.66)      
 
Other significant trends include the splintering of the unionist vote, with significant 
drops for both of the two main parties and a consolidation as well as an increase in 
the nationalist vote, with only 0.3% of the nationalist vote not going to the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) or SF, the two main nationalist parties, in 1998.   
 
The relative impact of demographic change and differences in turnout between 
nationalists and unionists in explaining the increased nationalist vote is difficult to 
quantify precisely.  The 1981 census was conducted during the Hunger Strike and in 
many nationalist areas census forms were burned as a form of protest with the result 
that an unknown number of predominantly working-class Catholics were not counted 
(Morris, Compton and Lukes, 1985).  High levels of political tension and street 
violence also limited the efficiency of the census and in addition, in this context, a 
large number of people did not fill out the religion question on the form.3  There is no 
agreement on the likely breakdown of this 'no response' group.4 The precise growth 
in the Catholic population from 1981 to 1991 is therefore not quantifiable but is 
probably at least 3% (Jardine, 1994, 197).  Indeed this might be a conservative 
figure.  Labour force surveys and fair employment monitoring suggests that this trend 
has continued since 1991 driven by a larger young Catholic population (for example 
52.6% of all under 16s were Catholic in the 1991 census, compared to 41.8% of 16-
64s) and also by a shift in the historical emigration pattern from one which saw many 
                                                          
3
 In 1981 18.5% did not answer this question compared to 9.4% in 1971 and a combined non-
response/no religion rate of 11% in 1991. 
4
 Jardine (1994, 218-9) argues that the fertility data and knowledge of Irish of this group is closer to the 
non-Catholic population, with Walsh (ibid,  210-14) arguing the opposite. Eversley (1989, 70) argues 
that as 27.1% of the 'religion not stated' group in 1981 are unemployed - a profile nearer to the Catholic 
than Protestant one - this no response group is likely to include more Catholics than Protestants. 
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more Catholics than Protestants leaving Northern Ireland to current estimates 
suggesting the opposite may now be occurring (Jardine, 1994, 213). 
 
There is also some evidence that nationalist voter turnout may have been higher than 
the unionist turnout in 1998.  While turnout was relatively high everywhere, averaging 
68.8%, solidly unionist constituencies such as Strangford and North Down had 
turnout figures of 62% and 60% respectively, while nationalist constituencies such as 
West Belfast and Foyle were at 70% and 72%, and deeply divided areas like Mid-
Ulster polled as high as 85%.  It is well established that turnout is a function of 
salience (Sinnott and Whelan, 1992, 165) and it may be that, despite the split in 
Unionism over the Agreement, where there was no significant competition with 
nationalists, unionists did not turn out in such great numbers.  On the other hand, 
despite the new close relationship between the SDLP and SF and the increased 
willingness of supporters of each party to transfer to the other (as discussed below) 
there was still intense rivalry between the parties for dominance within the nationalist 
community. While nationalist-unionist contests produced the highest turnouts, the 
contest within nationalism seems to have motivated voters to turn out in greater 
numbers than the battle between pro-Agreement and anti-Agreement unionism. It is 
also possible that because nationalists were more enthusiastic supporters of the 
Agreement, and saw it as a means of ending years of political stalemate, they were 
highly motivated to be active voters.  The increase in the nationalist vote from 1996 
to 1998 also confirms the importance of differentiated turnout as a partial 
explanation.  An increase of 2.5% in two years is unlikely to be demographically 
based.  Nonetheless at the macro level, most of the increase in the nationalist vote 
between 1982 and 1998 is clearly related to the increasing nationalist population 
relative to unionists. 
 
A study of transfer patterns is to some extent insulated from these macro 
demographic changes.  By their nature transfer percentages take first preferences as 
a given and so shifts in the pattern of transfers from, for example, UUP to AP are 
statistically isolated from a decline in the overall unionist vote, though there will of 
course be some political impact from the demographic situation.  When calculating 
overall percentages of transfers for an entire election, the denominator used in this 
article is the total number of votes to be distributed, including the votes which turn out 
to be non-transferrable.  For percentages of transfers at each count, however, there 
are two differences in the denominator used. Firstly, only transferable votes for the 
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count are included in the denominator – non-transferable votes are ignored in this 
calculation.  Secondly, for this paper, except of course when calculating party 
solidarity, transfers within a party have been omitted also. This method of calculation 
has the effect of clarifying the inter-party voting pattern considerably.  Where the 
focus of analysis is on changes in vote patterns outside party loyalty, this 
denominator allows us to see with greater clarity the relative magnitude of transfers 
other than those within the party.5  An example may help to make the approach clear: 
for two counts in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency, a similar situation 
arose in both 1982 and 1998. A UUP candidate’s transfers (2970 and 2720 of them, 
respectively) were distributed at a late stage in the count (count seven and count five 
respectively) and the party percentages are set out in table three. 
 
Table 3: Fermanagh South Tyrone, UUP transfers in count 7, 1982 and count 5, 1998 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Percentage received, using all votes as denominator 
 
Transfer recipient                    1982            1998           Change 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
DUP candidates                      407(14%)         256(9%)          -4% 
UK unionist candidate                                 66(2%) 
SF candidates                         8(<1%)          18(1%)         <+1% 
SDLP candidates                      27(<1%)          36(1%)         <+1% 
OUP/UUP candidates                 2427(82%)        2269(83%)         +2% 
Non-transferable                    101(3%)           75(3%)         >-1% 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Percentage received, omitting non-transferable and within-party votes from 
denominator 
1982 1998           Change 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
DUP candidates                      407(92%)         256(68%)         -24% 
UK unionist candidate                                 66(18%) 
SF candidates                         8(2%)           18(5%)           +3% 
SDLP candidates                      27(6%)           36(10%)          +3% 
OUP/UUP candidates                 2427             2269                
Non-transferable                    101               75 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          
5
 There is a second methodological problem in analyses of transfers under PRSTV, highlighted by 
Sinnott (1995, 203-8).  Transfers in later counts will have been ‘polluted’ by votes received, so for 
example a UUP ‘transfer’ will include voters whose first preference was given elsewhere but who then 
transfer to the UUP.  We believe that the effect of this problem is not sufficiently significant to detract 
from the trends highlighted by this analysis.  We do however note one exception to this in the section 
on nationalist transfers to pro-Agreement unionists below. 
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The large percentage of UUP transfers to UUP in both elections would be of great 
interest if our primary object of study here was party solidarity.   While this article 
does examine party solidarity and the trends in non-transferable votes as a context, 
its primary interest is in tracking the changes and consistencies in patterns of inter-
party transfers, which are highlighted more clearly if within-party transfers and non-
transferable votes are removed.  However, it is important to be clear about the 
denominator used, lest a false picture be given which might convey an exaggerated 
idea of voter change. Non-terminal percentages presented in this paper estimate 
inter-party transfer percentages at constituency level given that the set of voters is 
restricted to those crossing party lines i.e. where we exclude transfers to their own 
party in the calculation. The resulting estimates give non-terminal transfers an 
importance they do not have in terms of getting candidates elected; but as a result 
allow us to weigh up the views of the voter who crosses party lines with a great deal 
of sensitivity. This sensitivity will of course allow us to detect proportions of votes 
which move across the community, but will be equally sensitive to proportions of 
votes which do not cross the community divide, but revert to other parties in the 
voters’ community.6 
 
Northern Ireland is notable for the large number of political parties (some with just a 
few candidates) which feature in elections. Party information was used for the 
current analysis, but with certain small parties grouped together. Parties were 
classified as pro- or anti-Agreement and also identified as being unionist, nationalist 
or cross-community. See appendix A for the classifications and abbreviations used 
for each party in the tables and graphs below. Note that candidates have been 
classified as pro- and anti-Agreement based solely on their party membership. This 
simple party-based rule was followed despite the declared anti-Agreement stance of 
six candidates for the pro-Agreement UUP - Peter Weir, Roy Beggs Jr., John Hunter 
Jim Clarke, Jim Rodgers and John Junkin.  One reason for this is practical: 
gradations of adherence to the Good Friday agreement would be difficult to quantify. 
A second reason is that, politically, the individual candidate’s stance may well have 
been viewed by the voters as less important than the stance of the candidate’s party 
- and to some extent this has proved the case.  However a confirmatory  
                                                          
6
 This approach to the calculation of proportions differs from that of Elliott et al (e.g. Elliott and 
Wilford, 1983, Elliott and Smith, 1986) where in all their analyses of NI transfers (both their analyses 
of the election overall and of proportions at each count) the transfer proportions are calculated using as 
denominator the total votes to be distributed (whether they could actually be distributed or not). 
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analysis (not presented) was produced for all median differences used in this paper 
omitting the above six declared UUP anti-Agreement candidates from the data. In all 
cases the resulting estimates of change in transfer percentages were small. In only 
one case did the estimate of difference change significantly: in the absence of the six 
anti-Agreement candidates, the increase in transfers from pro-Agreement unionist 
parties to cross-community parties changed from borderline significance to 
significance; in no other case did an estimate of difference in transfer percentages 
change so as to alter any of the conclusions in the paper. 
 
OVERALL TRANSFER PATTERNS 
As a prelude to detailed analysis, it is useful to look at the crude overall transfer 
patterns including within-party solidarity and non-transferable votes.  At a macro level 
a number of trends are highlighted.  Unionist solidarity within both pro and anti-
Agreement blocs is reduced.  A more detailed breakdown (not shown) shows that on 
the pro-Agreement unionist side and for the UUP separately this was a general trend, 
possibly as a result of the splintering of the unionist vote.  But among the anti-
Agreement parties the decline in solidarity was, surprisingly, largely confined to DUP 
supporters.  Pro-Agreement transfers to anti-Agreement unionist parties fell in 
comparison to 1982, as might be expected, but the number of pro-Agreement 
unionist votes going non-transferable increases much more substantially than 
transfers to nationalists.  While the percentage of transfers going to nationalists was 
small, in absolute terms the shift from 1982 to 1998 was modest but clear: in 1982, 
there were just 368 ‘pro-Agreement’ unionist party transfers to nationalists; in 1998 
there were 4,303. 
 
Table four shows that the percentage of non-transferable votes increased for both 
pro and anti- agreement unionist parties.  This trend was general among pro-
Agreement unionists.  For the anti-Agreement parties, however, it occurred mainly in 
the larger, more important vote distributions.  For the many instances of smaller vote 
distributions there was if anything a decrease in median non-transferable vote 
percentage.  There is clearly a variety of behaviour hidden by the overall transfer 
percentages and this issue is analysed in more detail below. 
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Table Four: Overall transfer percentages for each election,  with the change from 1982 
to 1998 
 
      NI assembly elections, 1982 vs 1998    
                      ---------------% transferred to-----------    
         
               ->Unionist ->Cross-      ->    Nationalist %  Total 
Transfers from Election  Pro-
agreement 
Anti-
agreement 
community  SDLP Sinn Fein Non-trans-
ferable 
transferred 
Pro-agreement  
unionist-> 
1982 69.7 22.7 2.2 0.4 <0.1  5.0 87905  
 1998 61.2 14.7 5.6 4.9 0.4 13.2 81387  
Anti-agreement  
unionist-> 
1982 19.4 66.1 1.4 0.7 0.1 12.3 79799 
 1998 19.2 59.1 2.4 1.3 0.1 17.9 84115  
Cross  
community-> 
1982 21.9 3.8 26.9 24.3 1.8 21.3 21385 
 1998 28.5 5.2 20.2 27.3 4.1 14.8 31122 
SDLP-> 1982 0.8 0.9 18.3 57.1 6.3 16.6 62684 
 1998 4.2 0.8 11.2 50.3 16.2 17.3 41118 
Sinn Fein-> 1982 0.3 0.4 3.6 19.2 45.0 31.6 18858 
 1998 1.3 0.3 2.0 25.3 59.3 11.9 54815  
Change from 
1982 
        
Pro-agreement  
Unionist> 
 -8.49% -7.94% 3.45% 4.56% 0.30% 8.11%   
Anti-agreement  
Unionist> 
 -0.16% -6.99% 0.94% 0.59% -0.01% 5.64%   
Cross  
community-> 
 6.60% 1.46% -6.76% 2.93% 2.24% -6.48%   
SDLP->  3.41% -0.09% -7.12% -6.74% 9.81% 0.74%   
Sinn Fein->  0.99% -0.06% -1.67% 6.12% 14.31% -19.68%   
 
 
For nationalists the number of non-transferable votes falls and this is consistent with 
the substantial increase in transfers from the SDLP to SF and vice versa.  This is 
clearly a direct result of the ‘nationalist consensus’ strategy of the peace process and 
the IRA cease-fire.  In line with this, transfers from the SDLP to cross-community 
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parties (mainly Alliance), where in the past the bulk of SDLP terminal transfers have 
gone, reduced dramatically.  There is a fairly moderate increase in transfers from the 
SDLP to pro-Agreement unionists. There is a reduction in cross-community internal 
solidarity (no doubt due to the fact that Alliance now shares this bloc with the NIWC). 
Cross-community non-transferable votes also fall  as there are substantial increases 
in transfers from the cross-community parties to pro-Agreement unionists and to the 
SDLP.   For the percentage changes between 1982 and 1998, it may be more useful 
to present the data as a bar chart.   
 
Figure 1 
 
Both unionists and nationalists have increased their overall percentages of transfers 
to each other by between about 2% and about 5%, with the unionist change looking 
slightly more pronounced than the nationalist change. Pro-agreement unionists have 
increased their transfer percentage to cross-community parties by about 3%.  
Nationalist transfers to cross-community parties declined dramatically, by nearly 10% 
overall.  But transfers within the nationalist party group between the SDLP and Sinn 
Féin, with the common pro-Agreement platform to unite the community, have shown 
the largest of the group-to-group increases, with the 1998 nationalist-to-nationalist 
transfer percentage about 13% higher than in 1982.  
 
This broad overview is important in contextualising the analysis in the rest of this 
study.  We remove non-transferable votes from the remainder of the analysis to 
Change in % transfers, 1998-1982
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Pro-agreement
Un->
Anti-agreement
Un->
Cross
community->
Nationalist->
->Un/Pro-agreement ->Un/Anti-agreement
->Cross-community ->Nationalist
Non-transferable
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increase the sensitivity of the measurement, but clearly do so in the knowledge that 
shifts in cross-community voting are modest.  It is important that in the scrutiny of the 
detail the overall reluctance of voters to cross the community divide, even after they 
have exhausted all other possible transfers within their own community, is not lost.  
While there was a significant drop in transfers from pro-Agreement to anti-Agreement 
unionists, there was only a minor shift in the opposite direction.  The decline in anti-
Agreement solidarity and the continued willingness to transfer on to pro-Agreement 
unionists (presumably in competition with nationalists) certainly helped the UUP 
secure more seats than they might otherwise have done.  While this was a rational 
response in the context of the traditional political divide, in actual fact, given the 
concurrent majority system of voting for First Minister and Deputy First Minister, this 
voting behaviour weakened the capacity of anti-Agreement unionists to veto 
Assembly decisions.  If nationalists had won two extra seats at the expense of the 
UUP, unionists would still have a majority over nationalists but much more 
importantly when concurrent majorities are required, anti-Agreement unionists would 
have had a majority in the unionist bloc.7  Evans and O’Leary (1999,  1-25)  discuss 
the possible logic of such behaviour and raise the possibility of all manner of tactical 
reasons for such transfers but it is surely most probable that voters did not realise the 
consequences of what was otherwise a perfectly normal and traditional voting 
pattern. 
 
If the above crude percentages appear to show some post-Agreement changes, 
some questions remain.  Are these changes distinct enough to be more than the 
product of chance variation?  In other words, are these changes statistically 
significant?  Rallings and Thrasher (1993, 366-384) have argued that voter variability 
at constituency level may be missed at the aggregate or national level. What 
variation exists at constituency level within the overall summary figures presented in 
table four?  Even if the patterns and shifts are statistically significant what are the 
political implications of these trends?  The remainder of the article examines 
transfers at the level of individual counts in constituencies to try to form a pattern of 
the degree of variation in transfers between any two parties or blocs. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 This could have been circumvented if cross-community parties registered instead as unionists.  While 
this was legally possible it might not have been politically possible for a UUP leader to survive in such 
 DCU Business School  
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 42 
 
VARIATION PATTERNS IN INTER-PARTY AND INTER-BLOC TRANSFERS 
 
Statistical Techniques 
In the remainder of the article transfer percentages in 1998 are compared with 
percentages for the same party groupings in 1982, using plots of the transfers, and 
calculating the median differences between the elections and their 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs).8 The percentages of transfers are presented graphically using box-
and-whisker plots (described in more detail below).  These graphical displays show 
that in many cases, transfer percentages are not distributed symmetrically around 
their mean. Most of the displays of transfer percentages in this paper show a 
considerable number of ‘outlying’ percentages - often large percentages - far away 
from the main cluster of percentages, making the display of transfer percentages 
asymmetric. In statistical terms, the distribution of transfers is skewed.  For skewed 
data such as these, the mean is of limited value as a summarising statistic.  Because 
it can be highly influenced by one or two of the data which lie far away from most of 
the transfer percentages, the mean may not be at all typical of the data. If the 
difference between means is used on its own to examine change in transfers, this 
influence exerted on the mean by one or two outlying values can also suggest 
spuriously large ‘differences’ in mean transfers between elections. 
 
Non-parametric measures such as the median are more informative about such 
skewed data, and it is the median, the median difference and its 95% confidence 
interval which are used in this study.  The median is the ‘half-way point’ in a 
collection of data – the value of a variable above which half the observations lie and 
below which half the observations lie. Because it is determined by the numbers of 
observations rather than directly by the value of a variable, the median is a measure 
of centrality which is not swayed by extreme values in the same way as is the mean. 
Thus the median is more stable in the presence of extreme or outlying values such 
as we find with transfer percentages9.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
a situation. 
8
 This paper analyses transfer data for all counts in all constituencies in the 1982 and 1998 NI 
Assembly elections. Data for the 1982 election was taken from Elliott and Wilford (1983). Data for the 
1998 election was taken from a database compiled by Radio Telefís Eireann, and kindly made available 
by Michael Curran of RTÉ. 
9
 The median difference between elections in these categories and its 95% CI is estimated using a 
method based on the rank sum test – another non-parametric technique (Lehmann, 1963). 
 DCU Business School  
Research Paper Series 
Paper No 42 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
The data is presented diagrammatically indicating the difference in the pattern of 
transfers from 1982 to 1998.   For example, figure two shows the percentages 
transferred from pro-Agreement unionist candidates to cross community parties at 
each of the counts of the elections. It is difficult, however, to make much of this 
simple plot of the 46 counts where pro-Agreement unionists had an opportunity to 
transfer to cross-community parties. Many of the observations are crowded between 
10% and 20%. To explore these observations further, it will be useful to replace the 
middle 50% of the observations with a box and to indicate the halfway mark – the 
median of the observations – with a line through the box. If we then extend a line to 
the highest and lowest observation within some agreed length above and below the 
box, we have what is often called a box-and-whisker plot. 
 
For this and subsequent box-and-whisker plots, the dot symbol plots the mean 
(which, with more normally (or Gaussianly) distributed data, is usually within the box); 
the outliers – those observations which lie above or below the ‘whiskers’ - are plotted 
either with a “T” (for transfer percentages from terminal counts) or the  square symbol 
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(for transfer percentages from non-terminal counts).10   Outliers are here defined as 
the observations which are greater than the 75th  percentile plus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range or which are less than 25th percentile minus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range. 
 
Thus the ‘whisker’ below the box in our box-and-whisker plot will extend down to the 
lowest observation greater than or equal to the 25th percentile minus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range; and the ‘whisker’ above the box in the box-and-whisker plot will 
extend up to the highest observation less than or equal to the 75th percentile plus 1.5 
times the interquartile range.  To assist the reader in assessing the difference 
between the transfer percentages between the two elections, a dotted line is 
produced across from the median of each box plot, and the difference in height 
between the two medians is added. This quantity is usually close to the median 
difference, whose CI is presented in the plot.  Finally, details about the outlier transfer 
percentages are included in the plot of each election’s results. 
 
Pro-Agreement Unionist to cross-community parties 
The box-and-whisker plot summarising the plot of pro-Agreement Unionist to cross-
community parties is presented in figure three.  It is clear that pro-Agreement unionist 
to cross-community party transfers have increased at the median level by about 11% 
and that apart from a greater but still small number of cases when the percentage 
transferred was very high the overall pattern is similar. With the clustering of most 
percentages around 15%, together with a substantial number of outliers beyond the 
75th percentile, the differences between the elections is a little difficult to see even in 
the box-and-whisker plot.  It is clear that the percentages are not symmetrically 
distributed about some mean and are not, therefore, normally distributed. The mean 
for the 1998 election, for example, actually lies outside the 75th percentile- it is heavily 
influenced by the few large observations for that election.   These few large 
observations could lead to an estimate of difference which is misleadingly large if one 
used the mean as a summarising statistic. 
 
The estimate of overall median difference shows a borderline statistically significant 
increase in pro-Agreement unionist transfers to cross-community parties – the CI just 
includes zero.  As noted earlier, if anti-Agreement UUC candidates are excluded from 
                                                          
10
 A non-terminal count in this context is one where candidates from the same party remained, even 
though we have removed those intra-party transfers from the calculations to increase the sensitivity of 
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the analysis, the CI does not include zero, and the increase becomes significant at 
the 5% level. 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
Pro-Agreement Unionist to nationalist 
In figure four the box-and-whisker plot shows a modest increase of about 5% in the 
median percentages of transfers from pro-Agreement unionists to the SDLP for 1998 
when compared with those of 1982.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the measure of inter-party transfers. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
There are four instances of high unionist to SDLP transfer percentages which have 
no precedent in 1982.  These instances are, in all cases, late counts when the only 
choice is SF or the SDLP.  Even in these cases more than 60% of the votes are 
actually non-transferable (Remember we have removed non-transferable votes in 
calculating the percentages in the plot diagrams).  These outliers lead to a mean 
(plotted with the dot symbol in the box-and-whisker plot) outside the 75th percentile.  
The overall pattern of pro-Agreement unionist to SDLP transfers is one of a low 
overall transfer rate with a modest but statistically significant increase between 1982 
and 1998. 
 
In an analysis of pro-Agreement unionist to Sinn Féin transfers (not presented) it was 
possible to detect a statistically significant increase in unionist to SF transfers, but the 
actual number of votes was extremely small - the highest single transfer amounting 
to 32 votes out of 4,800.  Nonetheless despite the low absolute figure in this single 
case it represented nearly 15% of all transfers outside the UUP (with the balance 
going to the SDLP).  The median transfer for pro-Agreement unionists to SF was, 
however, only 1%. 
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A separate analysis of pro-Agreement terminal transfers when both the SDLP and SF 
remained (10 cases), showed an increase in the non-transferable vote of 5%.  
Therefore even when pro-Agreement unionists had the opportunity to influence the 
outcome as between SF and the SDLP, there was no increased tendency to support 
the more moderate nationalist party on tactical grounds, even if not on pro-
Agreement principle.  For example, in Newry-Armagh and in West Tyrone less than 
40% of UUP surpluses transferred to the SDLP, when only SF and the SDLP 
remained and were fighting for the last seats. 
 
Nationalist to pro-Agreement unionists 
SDLP transfers to pro-Agreement unionists follow a similar pattern to transfers in the 
reverse direction and are presented in figure five.  Overall median transfer 
percentages increased by 6%, a statistically significant increase, but were still very 
low.  The data is slightly more dispersed than the unionist to SDLP pattern as shown 
by the longer boxplot diagram.  Nonetheless the median transfer percentage is still 
only 7%.   One significant outlier with a percentage of nearly 70% exists in Derry 
East.  However this was the last count, when the UUP was fighting two anti-
Agreement candidates for the last seat.  While 150 transferred votes represented 
nearly 70% of transfers, over 30% went to the anti-Agreement candidates and of the 
total vote nearly 90% was non-transferable.  The overall pattern of change is 
therefore quite muted.  It is nonetheless statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
interval.  
 
There was no evidence, as might be expected, of any increase in Sinn Féin to pro-
Agreement unionist transfers.  The only noteworthy statistic is a lone 90% transfer in 
the Fermanagh & South Tyrone constituency in the 1998 election.   However, on 
closer examination, the Sinn Féin candidate had just received a large SDLP transfer 
and under the counting regulations only the 'last bundle received' is re-checked when 
calculating surpluses after the first count. Therefore, these were voters who gave 
their first preference to the SDLP and then transferred first of all to SF and then to the 
UUP, and even then 57% of the surplus was non-transferable.    
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Nationalist to Cross Community Parties 
In the past, for terminal transfers (i.e. transfers in counts where there was no SDLP 
candidate left to receive votes) SDLP supporters had consistently transferred in 
greater percentages to the AP than to their fellow-nationalists in SF (Elliott et al, 
1983, 52, 56 and 61 and Elliott et al, 1986, 36). In Elliott et. al’s figures, which include 
non-transferable votes in the denominator, the percentages for SDLP terminal 
transfers to AP are 58%, 37%, 79% and 51% in local council elections and assembly 
election in 1977, 1981, 1982 and 1985 respectively. (The last, reduced figure of 51% 
came “after warnings from the SDLP leadership to voters about transfers” (Elliott et 
al, 1986, 36)).   
 
Figure six shows a box-and-whisker diagram for SDLP to cross community parties.  
We can see that, despite the rather wide dispersion of observations as evidenced by 
the relatively long boxes in the box-and-whisker plot, the plot does suggest a 
pronounced decrease in transfers to cross-community parties from SDLP voters, in 
the order of 41%.  When transfers to the Alliance Party alone are analysed (in figure 
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seven) there is an even larger drop of 61%.  The 95% CI for the median difference in 
transfers to the Alliance Party is –76% to –19%, the interval does not include zero 
and therefore the drop in SDLP transfers is statistically significant. 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
The comparison with the position of Sinn Féin voters is interesting here. Although the 
number of counts where SF supporters had the opportunity to transfer to cross-
community parties was small, there appears to be (if anything) an increase in SF 
transfers to them.  Figure eight suggests a 17% increase in SF transfers to cross-
community parties.  In fact, however, the estimates for median difference show us 
that we do not have enough evidence from the two elections to  say that the increase 
is statistically significant.  Many of the transfers seem to go to the Women's Coalition 
rather than Alliance  but the change does not appear to hold for the four terminal 
counts we have and the data is too sparse to make a conclusion here.  Furthermore 
the single biggest transfer in this data was on the elimination of Joe Cahill in North 
Antrim.  While nearly 70% of all inter-party transfers went to Alliance this was based 
on an inter-party transfer of only 115 votes out of 2496, as another SF candidate 
remained.  Even this figure is likely to be related to the fact that Cahill had received 
over 600 SDLP transfers in two earlier counts, presumably due to his high personal 
profile and reputation. 
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
Overall, this result was a blow for the cross-community parties, who saw their difficult 
role in the negotiations rewarded with what looks very like a change in the SDLP vote 
pattern away from them - a statistically significant one in the case of transfers to 
Alliance.  In contrast the cross community parties gained a significant increase in the 
level of transfers they attracted from pro-Agreement unionist parties.  Overall 
therefore the median differences suggest that, with the rise in unionist support and 
the fall in nationalist transfers, there was overall no change in support for the cross-
community parties from other pro-Agreement parties.  It remains to be seen however 
what the political effect will be of the shift in the transfer based support for cross-
community parties, especially the Alliance Party.   If Alliance perceives that an 
important element of their support base, from the point of view of having people 
elected, comes increasingly from the moderate end of traditional unionism rather 
than both unionism and nationalism, this could change the basis of their political 
position. 
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SDLP to Sinn Féin Transfers 
SDLP transfers show a strong tendency to shift towards SF, with figure nine 
suggesting an increase in the median transfer percentage of 23%.  The box-and-
whisker plot is interesting not only because it shows the large increase in SDLP 
transfers to SF, but also because it suggests that the pattern in 1998 was consistent 
throughout Northern Ireland. The box-and-whisker plot for 1982 is quite extended, 
because the middle 50% of the counts span a wide range of percentages, with from 
under 20% to over 80% of transfers going to SF.  By comparison Elliot et al. (1983; 
1985) calculate SDLP transfers to SF at 22.4% in 1982 and 34% in the 1985 local 
elections.  The picture in 1998, in contrast, shows transfers from SDLP to SF 
concentrated with remarkable consistency around the 64% mark. This change in 
pattern looks very strong and could cause difficulties for the relationship between the 
cross-community parties and SDLP in the future.  
 
Figure 9 
 
 
 
It certainly seems that SDLP voters have endorsed the closer working relationship 
between the two nationalist party elites which was at the heart of the peace process 
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and have responded to this with a high and consistent level of transfers. This may be 
a long term electoral problem for the cross-community parties, who have in the past 
benefited from their appeal to both sides of the community (Elliott et al, 1993, 52), 
while numerically they gained a much greater proportion of transfers from the SDLP 
as can be seen in table four.   While the pattern of change seems clear from figure 
nine, the confidence interval for median difference does not show the increase in 
SDLP transfers to SF as statistically significant at the 5% level. This may be because 
of the large variation in the 1982 results. 
 
Sinn Féin to SDLP Transfers 
The shift in transfer pattern from the SDLP to SF is replicated in the opposite 
direction.  Although in 1982 transfers from SF tended to be at a higher level than 
those of SDLP to SF, with a median percentage of over 80%, they did have a 
reasonably wide range.  
 
Figure 10 
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In 1998 the median percentage increased to over 95% and the spread narrowed 
considerably. While there is certainly still a degree of polarisation within the 
nationalist community, voters do seem to have responded to the peace process with 
a considerable increase in the level of mutual support in transfers, although neither 
change reaches statistical significance. 
 
Pro and anti-Agreement unionist transfers to each other 
A more detailed analysis of transfers between pro and anti agreement unionists 
reveals some patterns hidden by the overall percentages of table four.  
 
Figure 11 
 
 
 
As indicated in figure 11, the drop in median difference of 18% for UUP to anti-
Agreement parties reflects the drop in table four.  However, we can also see from the 
boxplot that transfers in 1982 were clustered tightly around the median of 87% with 
just a few low outliers, while in 1998, in addition to the median drop, there was a 
much wider spread of behaviour with the lower quartile dropping much lower (while 
retaining high percentages at the other end).  If all pro-Agreement parties are taken 
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together (not presented) the drop and spread is even more pronounced, with median 
difference falling by 22% and a longer central box in the diagram.  This indicates that 
pro-Agreement unionists were much more divided in their attitude to the anti-
Agreement unionist parties than in 1982. 
 
The median difference analysis of anti-Agreement to pro-Agreement unionist 
transfers reveals a pattern almost entirely hidden by the relatively unchanged overall 
percentages of table four.    There is a significant drop of 25% in the median transfer 
and when the DUP is treated separately (in figure 12) the median transfer percentage 
drops by 34%.  
 
Figure 12  
 
 
 
The static overall figures in table four can be explained by high percentages of 
transfers in a small number of cases which involved large absolute numbers of votes.  
The drop in the median has a significant impact in reducing the number of occasions 
in which anti-Agreement unionists help to elect pro-Agreement unionist candidates, 
as discussed in the next section.  It is not a consistent drop however.  Like pro-
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Agreement unionists, the anti-Agreement party supporters are divided in their views 
on transfers to fellow unionists.  The box plot shows that examples of transfer 
percentages at very high levels continued, helping to explain some of the success of 
the UUP in winning marginal seats. 
 
It is worth returning to the issue of unionist solidarity in this context and analysing it in 
more detail, using the median and the box plots rather than a simple percentage as 
in table four.  
 
Figure 13  
 
 
 
The boxplot of pro-Agreement unionist solidarity shown in figure 13 indicates that the 
median drop in within-party transfers is not as dramatic as the percentage in table 
four. This is because the mean is heavily influenced by a few outliers of very low 
percentages, whereas the median is less influenced in this way.  This along with the 
relatively high variability shown by the greater spread in 1998 helps explain why the 
pro-unionist bonus of seats over votes increased, despite the drop in solidarity 
indicated in table four. Anti-agreement unionist solidarity shows no median change 
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from 1982 despite a drop in overall solidarity.   Transfers are however more 
concentrated around the median, with a fall off in the number of cases of low 
solidarity.  Much of the drop in solidarity seems to be within the DUP. When the DUP 
is analysed separately, their median solidarity drops by 9%. For anti-Agreement 
parties excluding the DUP there is in fact a (non-significant) increase in anti-
Agreement solidarity of 22%, highlighting again the variability of behaviour among 
unionist voters. 
 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFERS ON THE ELECTION OUTCOME 
An initial assessment of the impact of transfers can be carried out by looking at the 
level of proportionality of seats won to first preference votes achieved, by parties and 
blocs.  Table five shows that the SDLP and the Anti-Agreement unionists achieved a 
number of seats very close to the proportion predicted by their first preference 
support in 1998.  Sinn Féin were however under-represented by 1% and cross-
community parties by 1.9%.  Pro-agreement unionists were the main beneficiaries 
with a bonus of 2.9% of seats over first preference votes. The UUP on its own 
achieved a 4.7% bonus of seats over first preference result, despite the election of 
two 'pro-Agreement candidates' from the PUP.  While the DUP's 1998 result is 
broadly proportionate, this is in contrast with a seats bonus of 3.9% in 1982. 
 
Table 5 Bonus of percentage seats won over first preference vote; 1982 and 1998 by 
party and bloc. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Party / Bloc               % Bonus 1982 % Bonus 1998 
_________________________________________________________ 
UUP                            3.6   4.7 
SDLP                         -0.8   0.3 
DUP                           3.9   0.4 
SF                             -3.7  -1.0 
AP                              3.5  -0.9 
UKUP                        N/A   0.1 
PUP                           -0.2  -0.7 
UDP                          N/A  -1.1 
NIWC                          N/A   0.3 
IND                            -0.4  -1.5 
Other unionist             -2.9  -0.2 
Other nationalist        -3.0  -0.3 
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Pro-agreement unionist        3.4   2.9 
Anti-agreement unionist       2.6   0.3 
Cross-community                3.1  -1.9 
Nationalist                   -7.5  -1.0 
_____________________________________________________________  
A comparison with 1982 provides stark evidence of the impact of changing transfer 
patterns on the cross-community parties, especially Alliance.  Even though the loss 
of nationalist transfers to cross-community parties was largely compensated by an 
increase in UUP transfers, they lost their comparative advantage in securing 
transfers. Alliance are over-represented in 1982 by 3.5% and win twice as many 
seats as SF with fewer first preferences.  In 1998 Alliance are underrepresented by 
0.9% and the cross-community bloc in total by 1.9%. 
 
This shift in transfer bonuses away from Alliance has largely benefited nationalists, 
who had a highly proportionate outcome overall, with an underrepresentation of just 
1%.  Again this can be contrasted with 1982.  In 1982 SF ran very few candidates as 
it was their first modern electoral contest.  There was also relatively low levels of 
transfers and a wide range of experiences across the different constituencies, 
between the SDLP and SF.  This ultimately led to the SDLP being underrepresented 
by 0.8%, SF by 3.7% and the nationalist bloc in total by 7.5%.  The large increase in 
SF-SDLP transfers in both directions is enough to give the SDLP a proportionate 
outcome in 1998 and bring SF to within 1%.  The near monopoly of the SDLP and SF 
within the nationalist bloc and the high level of solidarity leads to a 14.2% increase in 
the number of seats won, off a 8% increase in the total nationalist vote.  The SDLP in 
1998 also gains slightly from pro-Agreement unionist and cross-community transfers 
but the number of such transfers are too small to give the SDLP the sort of bonus 
often achieved by larger parties under PRSTV in the Republic of Ireland (Gallagher, 
1975, p. 512) and achieved by the UUP in Northern Ireland in 1998.    
 
The unionist experience, by contrast, is not as easily extrapolated from the overall 
transfer patterns because of the variability in unionist voter behaviour.  While there is 
a drop in pro-Agreement unionist solidarity it is not as marked at the median level 
(displayed in figure 13) as for the overall percentages (outlined in table four).  There 
were still many incidents of high UUP solidarity.  Likewise while there is a significant 
drop in the median of anti-Agreement to pro-Agreement unionist transfers, the overall 
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percentages did not change to the same extent. This may be because in 1998 the 
instances of higher transfer percentages, though fewer, tended to occur in the 
important cases when the number of votes being transferred was large.  Pro-
agreement unionists also benefited from a considerable increase in the overall cross-
community transfer percentage to them.  There was actually a slight decline of 6% in 
the median difference but the spread was much wider with examples of very high 
percentages (over 70%) which simply did not occur in 1982.  There was also, as 
indicated above, a small increase in SDLP transfers.  Collectively this was sufficient 
to give the UUP the edge in marginal seats.   The DUP performance is more easily 
analysed.  There was a drop of median party solidarity of 9% and a drop in pro-
Agreement transfers of 22%.  Together they can explain the DUP's loss of their seats 
bonus 
 
An aggregate level analysis such as this, while offering some capacity to measure 
the impact of transfers, is also influenced by other factors such as vote management 
and the number of candidates.  While a specific causal relationship cannot be 
proven, the patterns of gains and loses on seats won compared with first preference 
votes achieved are consistent with the patterns of transfers seen in this article.   
 
It is also possible to analyse the political impact of transfers by looking at the number 
of cases where inter-party transfers had a significant influence on a candidates 
overall performance.  While there are many ways of quantifying such an impact, in 
this study a candidate is counted as having substantially helped to elect someone if 
that candidate’s transfers lie in the top half of the elected candidate’s transfers – i.e. if 
the number of votes transferred by the candidate is at least as large as the median 
transfer received by the elected candidate.   Thus if a candidate from the UUP is 
elected and in the course of five counts receives 10, 500, 2, 25 and 122 transfers, the 
candidates transferring 500, 25 and 122 transfers will all be considered as having 
helped the candidate substantially. If the above three transfers came from the UUP, 
SDLP and DUP respectively, each of these parties would be counted as having 
contributed substantially to the election of the UUP candidate. If the three transfers 
came from the UUP, SDLP and again from the UUP respectively, the SDLP would be 
counted once as having contributed to the election of the UUP candidate, and the 
UUP would be counted twice.  
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Note that the use here of the median as the cutoff point in the definition of 
‘substantial’ support means that some quite small quantities of votes will be counted 
as substantial.  For example, in 1998, North Antrim UUP candidate Rev Robert 
Coulter received nine separate transfers of amounts varying from eight votes (from 
SDLP’s McCamphill) to 1,100 votes (from fellow UUP candidate Campbell). The 
median transfer consisted of 37 votes and turned out to be from SF’s Joe Cahill. This 
is one of the cases counted as a substantial contribution from SF to the UUC in table 
six.  
 
Table 6: Electoral impact of transfer patterns 
 
  Individual transfers which helped substantially to elect someone 
       Total  
       Number of 
             From Unionist from Cross- from Nationalist Such  
Transfers to  Election  Pro-agreement Anti-agreement community SDLP Sinn Fein Transfers 
Pro-agreement  
unionist 
1982 32  (40%)  32  (40%)  13  (16%)  3   (4%)  1   (1%)  81(100%) 
 1998 42  (46%)  26  (28%)  17  (18%)  5   (5%)  2   (2%)  92(100%) 
Anti-agreement  
unionist 
1982 29  (40%)  35  (49%)  3   (4%)  4   (6%)  1   (1%)  72(100%) 
 1998 32  (40%)  35  (44%)  9  (11%)  3   (4%)  1   (1%)  80(100%) 
Cross  
community 
1982 5  (12%)  7  (17%)  7  (17%)  21  (51%)  1   (2%)  41(100%) 
 1998 10  (42%)  4  (17%)  6  (25%)  2   (8%)  2   (8%)  24(100%) 
SDLP 1982 4   (8%)  6  (12%)  8  (16%)  25  (51%)  6  (12%)  49(100%) 
 1998 12  (26%)  1   (2%)  8  (17%)  10  (22%)  15  (33%)  46(100%) 
Sinn Fein 1982 1  (10%)  1  (10%)  2  (20%)  5  (50%)  1  (10%)  10(100%) 
 1998 5  (11%)  3   (7%)  4   (9%)  11  (24%)  23  (50%)  46(100%) 
 
 
Using the mean as a cutoff point for the definition of ‘substantial support’ would avoid 
many instances of such apparently small numbers of votes being counted as 
substantial. It should be born in mind, however, that half of the transfers which occur 
in the two elections of 1982 and 1998 consist of 28 votes or less; and that a quarter 
of the candidates elected beat the runner-up by less than 450 votes. In this context, 
SF’s 37-vote contribution to the UUC candidate above might be regarded as 
politically useful, and numerically substantial.  
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There were a total of 253 instances of individual transfers which contributed 
substantially to electing a candidate in 1982, and 307 instances of this in 1998 and 
these are set out in table six.  Instances of pro-Agreement Unionist candidates 
substantially helping Nationalist candidates to get elected more than triple from five in 
1982 to 17 in 1998. Both SF and SDLP benefit from pro-Agreement Unionist 
transfers. When it comes to substantial Nationalist support for pro-Agreement 
Unionists the change is less striking: there are four instances of this in 1982 and 
seven in 1998.  
 
We can see that the overall decline in pro-Agreement Unionist solidarity did not 
prevent an increase in the number of pro-Agreement Unionist candidates who 
substantially helped each other to get elected. The number of these increased from 
32 in the 1982 election to 42 in 1998.  This self-help represented 40% of substantial 
support for pro-Agreement unionists elected in 1982, but 46% in 1998. For the anti-
Agreement grouping the percentage of within-group instances of substantial support 
is in line with the drop in overall solidarity suggested by table four. Nevertheless, the 
analysis at constituency/count level shows that the decline in anti-Agreement 
solidarity was far from universal.  
 
Despite the fact that the overall percentage of anti-Agreement unionists transferring 
to pro-Agreement unionists continued at the same level, there is at constituency level 
a significant drop in the median difference and this is reflected in a drop in the 
number of times they helped to elect  pro-Agreement candidates (26 times in 1998 
compared to 32 in 1982).  The substantial seat bonus for the UUP is generated, 
when you measure impact in our terms, by effective, if diminished, solidarity within 
pro-Agreement unionism, significantly increased transfers from cross-community 
parties, and marginally increased support from nationalists.  Furthermore, despite the 
overall drop in transfers from pro-Agreement unionists to anti-Agreement unionists as 
shown in table four, when it came to electing people, pro-Agreement unionists 
actually helped substantially to elect anti-Agreement candidates at similar rates in 
1998 and in 1982.  Ironically,  cross-community voters  helped elect anti-Agreement 
candidates more often in 1998, with nine such cases compared to three in 1982. It is 
clear that using simple Northern Ireland wide percentages hides the complexity of the 
impact of transfers.  Pro-agreement unionist solidarity seems to have been high 
where it mattered, even if the overall average shows a decline.  While anti-
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Agreement unionist transfers helped to elected pro-Agreement candidates less often 
than in 1982 they still helped 26 times.  (A significant level even allowing for a single 
candidate being helped more than once, given that only 30 pro-Agreement unionists 
were elected).  There is still great continuity in unionist transfers across the political 
divide within unionism but clearly greater divisions in attitudes as evidenced by the 
greater variation in boxplots. 
 
Transfers within the Nationalist grouping (both within-party and between-party) 
increased overall in 1998 compared with 1982 (table four). In line with this, the 
number of incidents when Nationalist candidates were elected with substantial help 
from transfers from fellow Nationalists also increased from 37 in 1982 to 59 in 1998. 
But it is also clear from table four that while overall Nationalist solidarity increased, 
this occurred largely among SF candidates. Table six shows the effects of this at a 
practical level. Sinn Féin candidates received substantial help in the form of transfers 
from their own party 23 times in 1998, while this occurred only once in 1982.  This is 
largely if not entirely explained by the fact that 1982 was Sinn Féin's first electoral 
contest in the modern period, they ran very few candidates and were only beginning 
to establish their electoral support base.  In contrast to this, the decline in SDLP 
solidarity overall is reflected in the fact that for the SDLP instances of substantial 
intra-party support decline from 25 in 1982 to only 10 in 1998.  This is balanced by 
the substantial increase in transfers to SF, which sees SF gain seats in much closer 
proportion to their vote in 1998.  However there are substantial increases in the 
number of candidates helped by transfers between the SDLP and SF in both 
directions, but with SF in particular seeing a very large rise (again partly explained by 
the relatively low number of candidates in 1982).  Again the effect of this is clear in 
seats won, with nationalists much more proportionately represented in the Assembly 
in 1998 compared with 1982, without any loss for the SDLP. 
 
Consistent with the overall increase in pro-Agreement Unionist transfers to cross-
community parties, there were 10 instances of substantial support for cross-
community candidates elected in 1998 from pro-Agreement Unionist transfers, where 
there were only 5 in 1982. On the Nationalist side, the opposite trend holds. Again in 
line with the overall trend suggested by table 4 of the paper and the boxplots, SDLP 
transfers give substantial help to elect just two cross-community candidates in 1998, 
where it had helped to elect 21 in 1982. Similarly, there were two instances where SF 
helped substantially to elect a cross-community candidate in 1998. This represented 
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almost no change from 1982, where it helped just one cross-community candidate 
substantially. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On a macro level the most significant electoral impact of the peace process has been 
to increase substantially electoral solidarity within nationalism by increasing transfers 
in both directions between the SDLP and SF.  One effect of this has been to end the 
previous overrepresentation of the Alliance Party, as they have lost their comparative 
advantage in securing substantial SDLP transfers.  There has been a modest but 
borderline significant increase in pro-Agreement unionist transfers to Alliance but not 
enough to compensate for the loss of support from SDLP voters.  1998 also saw a 
decrease in DUP solidarity and the erosion of the DUP’s previous 
overrepresentation. 
 
The detailed analysis of transfers at constituency level gives us a much more 
sophisticated picture of the pattern of transfers across Northern Ireland.  The box-
plots show the extent to which average figures hide a wide variety of voting 
behaviour and also cases where voters displayed similar transfer patterns across 
various counts and constituencies.  These diagrams indicate a small increase in most 
cases in inter-bloc voting among the pro-Agreement parties, with the fall in SDLP 
support for Alliance being the main exception.  We can detect a statistically 
significant 5% increase in pro-Agreement unionist transfers to the SDLP and a similar 
increase in the opposite direction.  The pattern of transfers is reasonably consistent, 
but both sets of transfers include isolated cases of much higher transfers much more 
frequently in 1998 than in 1982.  The numbers are still very small, the situations 
isolated and the majority of voters are much more likely to go non-transferable than 
cross the community divide, but a greater number of voters are making that choice. 
 
The analysis of inter-party voting within nationalism shows that the pattern has 
shifted as well as the average.  The wide spread of behaviour by SDLP voters in 
1982 has shifted to a much more uniform behaviour with almost two thirds of SDLP 
voters transferring to SF.  Likewise, transfers from SF to SDLP show less variation as 
well as a higher median.  The evidence within the unionist bloc is more varied.  At a 
macro level pro-Agreement unionist transfers to anti-Agreement unionists drop, while 
anti-Agreement transfers to pro-Agreement unionists stay at the same level as 1982.  
A more detailed analysis reveals a wide variety of behaviour at constituency level.  In 
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fact pro-Agreement unionist help to elect anti-Agreement candidates at similar rates 
in both elections.  Overall despite its variability at constituency level it is the UUP 
which benefits most from transfers in the contest for marginal seats. 
 
The extent to which voters crossed the traditional political divide to support pro-
Agreement candidates in the other community has increased with statistical 
significance, but remains very limited based on this analysis of the 1998 election.  
Within nationalism however, the impact of the peace process is clear with a 
substantial increase in inter-party solidarity and representation in terms of seats, 
further boosting the demographic gains of the past 20 years. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
                                                                               Attitude to 
                                    Abbreviated   Grouped                       agreement 
     Party name (as of 1998)           name        party       Community       (as of 1998) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Ulster Unionist Party              UUP/OUP       UUP/OUP   Unionist          Pro-agreement 
 Social Democratic and  
  Labour Party                      SDLP          SDLP      Nationalist       Pro-agreement 
 Democratic Unionist Party          DUP/UDUP      DUP/UDUP  Unionist          Anti-agreement 
 Sinn Féin                          SF            SF        Nationalist       Pro-agreement 
 Alliance Party                     AP            AP        Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 UK Unionist Party                  UKUP          UKUP      Unionist          Anti-agreement 
 Progressive Unionist Party         PUP           PUP       Unionist          Pro-agreement 
 Ulster Democratic Party            UDP           UDP       Unionist          Pro-agreement 
 Women's Coalition                  NIWC          NIWC      Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Labour                             Lab           Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Green Party                        GP            Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Conservative                       CON           Ind       Unionist          N/A 
 Workers Party                      WP            OthN      Nationalist       Pro-agreement 
 Natural Law Party                  NLP           Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Socialist Party                    SP            Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Independent Unionist               IndU          OthU      Unionist          Anti-agreement 
 E106                               E106          Ind       Cross-community   N/A 
 Independent                        Ind           Ind       Cross-community   N/A 
 Independent Labour                 IndL          Ind       Cross-community   N/A 
 Independent Nationalist            IndN          OthN      Nationalist       N/A 
 NL                                 NL            Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 United Ulster Unionist Party       UUUP          OthU      Unionist          Anti-agreement 
 Independent Democratic Unionist    IndDU         OthU      Unionist          Anti-agreement 
 Independent SDLP                   IndSDLP       OthN      Nationalist       Pro-agreement 
 Communist Party of Ireland         CPI           Ind       Cross-community   N/A 
 Vanguard Unionist                  VanU          OthU      Unionist          N/A 
 United Loyalist Democratic Party   ULDP          OthU      Unionist          N/A 
 Peoples Democracy                  PplsD         OthN      Nationalist       N/A 
 Ecology Party                      Ecol          Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Liberal Party                      Lib           Ind       Cross-community   Pro-agreement 
 Ulster Popular Unionist Party      UPUP          OthU      Unionist          N/A 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 N/A=Not available/not applicable 
 
 
Parties whose orientation towards the 1998 agreement was unclassifiable, mainly those who 
contested in 1982 but not in 1998 or who no longer existed, are included in the broad summary of 
voting patterns in table two but not elsewhere in the calculations. 
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